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  A central issue on the political economy of fiscal adjustments is whether these 
adjustments bring about any economic consequence or not, because governments that 
decide to launch a fiscal consolidation do so expecting certain positive (and negative) 
consequences in different parts of the economy and for different social groups.  
   
Theoretical predictions regarding the economic consequences of fiscal 
consolidations are varied and sometimes even contradictory. For example, while 
standard Keynesian theory predicts that a fiscal adjustment will reduce the level of 
output, supply-side theorists sustain the opposite. In their view if tax cuts and 
decreasing interest rates accompany the fiscal adjustment, consolidations can have a 
crowding-in effect of private investment and consumption that might eventually 
overcome the loss in economic presence of t he public sector and have overall 
expansionary effects. 
 
Given the remarkable increase in the number of fiscal adjustment episodes in 
Europe in the process toward Monetary Union, the analysis of the economic impact that 
this adjustments may have had, has recently become a crucial issue whose relevance 
goes beyond its implications for the traditional theoretical disputes because it impinges 
directly on the current policy-making debate. 
 
Therefore, this paper attempts to answer three related questions: (1) What are the 
macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy?; (2) What are the economic effects of fiscal 
adjustments; And (3) given that most adjustment episodes in Europe have taken place 
during the last decade, have fiscal adjustments in the nineties had the same economic 
impact that they had in the past? 
 
Although the empirical literature on the effects of fiscal policy on economic 
activity in advanced economies expands from macroeconomic models that estimate the 
                                                 
* The author would like to thank the Social Science Research Council Program in Applied Economics, the 
International Monetary Fund and the Juan March Institute for their financial support during the period in 
which this paper was written. Also, the author would like to express his gratitude to Carles Boix, Roberto 
Perotti, Wolfgang Merkel, Marco Buti, Alex Segura-Ubiergo, José Manuel González-Páramo and José 
María Maravall for their valuable insights. Of course, the usual disclaimer applies.    2 
sign of fiscal multipliers to simulations that try to test the Ricardian equivalence, the 
most popular strand of this empirical literature is the one that draws lessons by looking 
across episodes of fiscal consolidations, with a special emphasis on identifying 
expansionary fiscal adjustments. Even if the country samples that are included in the 
analyses differ between studies, most of them identify expansionary fiscal contractions 
and confirm the original Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) finding, namely that Denmark 




In order to test if these findings apply also to the set of fifteen EU Member 
States between 1960-2000 (with an special focus on the 1990s), this paper basically 
replicates those analyses with a sample of 53  adjustment episodes
2. The  paper 
introduces important innovations with respect to previous studies besides the updated 
time-frame and the focus on EU countries. By focusing on the effects that different 
budgetary compositions have on the level of inequality after fiscal adjustment episodes, 
the paper presents very strong empirical evidence pointing to the existence of a trade-off 
between growth and equality mediated by fiscal policy. While expenditure-based 
adjustments perform better in terms of subsequent economic growth than do revenue-
based adjustments, the latter are less harmful in terms of income inequality. 
 
Section 2 summarizes the theoretical debate about fiscal policy and the 
macroeconomy, and offers some preliminary empirical evidence pointing to t he 
existence of non-Keynesian effects linked to the quality of the budget, as well as the 
existence of an important trade-off between growth and equality mediated by fiscal 
policy. Section 3 analyses in detail the 53 episodes of fiscal adjustment occurred in the 
EU in the last forty years, and demonstrates that in the short-run fiscal adjustments that 
rely on spending cuts, that start in conditions of fiscal stress, and that are accompanied 
by monetary expansions, can increase economic growth, but at the expense of 
increasing income inequality. Finally, section 4, confirms that these findings are 
reinforced when the decade of the nineties is analyzed in isolation. Last section 
summarizes the main findings and concludes. 
                                                 
1 See Appendix 1 for a detailed revision of these studies. 
2 In this respect, the paper that I take as the main reference is Alesina and Ardagna (1998). For the criteria 
that has been used for the selection of adjustment episodes, refer to section 3 of this paper.   3 
 
2. Fiscal Policy and the Macroeconomy 
 
  The effects of fiscal policy on the macroeconomy have been subject to a long 
and fruitful debate. The understanding of the different theoretical contributions to this 
issue is crucial in order to comprehend the possible economic impact of fiscal 
adjustments, and the channels through which fiscal variables influence the economy.  
 
2.1. Demand-Side Effects of Fiscal Policy: Keynesian Effects
3 
 
  A natural place to start a review of the theoretical literature on the demand-side 
effects of fiscal policy is with the Keynesian approach. The simplest Keynesian model 
assumes price rigidity and slack in productive capacity, so that output is determined by 
aggregate demand. In this model, a fiscal expansion has a multiplier effect on aggregate 
demand and output. The Keynesian multiplier exceeds one, it increases with the 
responsiveness of consumption to current income, and it is larger for a spending 
increase than for a tax cut. If a spending increase is matched by a tax increase, the 
resulting “balanced budget multiplier” is exactly one.  
 
  Extensions of the simplest Keynesian model allow for crowding-out through 
induced changes in interest rates and the exchange rate. This is additional to the 
crowding-out which occurs to the extent that the government provides goods and 
services that substitute those provided by the private sector, and insofar as part of any 
increase in domestic demand in an open economy is met from imports. The extent of 
crowding-out affects the size of fiscal multipliers but does not change their sign. In the 
standard IS-LM model, private investment depends negatively on interest rates, and 
therefore a fiscal expansion paid for by increased borrowing that leads to higher interest 
rates reduces investment. In the open economy IS-LM (Mundell-Fleming) model, there 
can also be crowding-out through the exchange rate. Higher interest rates attract capital 
inflows which appreciate the exchange rate, and the resulting deterioration in the 
                                                 
3 The next three sections are based on an internal document produced by the Fiscal Affairs Department of 
the International Monetary Fund in which the author worked. From now on this document will be referred 
as IMF (2000).   4 
external current account offsets the increase in domestic demand deriving from a fiscal 
expansion. 
 
Crowding-out through interest rates and the exchange rate is influenced by 
certain features of the IS-LM framework such as: (1) the determinants of private 
investment (crowding-out is likely to be greater if investment is fairly sensitive to 
interest rates); (2) money demand and monetary policy (the tendency for interest rates to 
rise in response to a fiscal expansion could be offset by a monetary expansion; (3) 
openness and the exchange rate regime (with perfect capital mobility and flexible 
exchange rates and perfect capital mobility, there is a complete crowding-out and so 
fiscal policy is ineffective). 
 
The extent of crowding-out is also affected by price flexibility. Neo-Keynesian 
models allow for price flexibility, although nominal rigidities remain if prices do not 
adjust completely to clear markets. Price flexibility, even if it is limited in the short 
term, will tend to narrow the range of values taken by fiscal multipliers, and in 
particular to limit the influence of the exchange rate regime. In an open economy with a 
flexible exchange rate, the extent of crowding-out depends on the response of domestic 
prices to changes in the exchange rate. In particular, if domestic prices move with the 
exchange rate, crowding-out will be less than with price rigidity, since appreciation of 
the exchange rate will lower prices. With a fixed exchange rate, the current account will 
deteriorate in response to price increases via a real appreciation of the exchange rate, 
and there will be more crowding-out than with price rigidity.  
   
Changes in interest rates, the exchange rate, and prices can in addition influence 
crowding-out via wealth effects on aggregate demand. This will be the case in particular 
if consumption depends of current financial wealth. An increase in interest rates will 
generally reduce the nominal value of financial assets, as will an appreciation of the 
exchange rate in the case of foreign currency denominated assets. For households and 
firms that are net creditors these wealth  effects will reinforce the crowding-out effects 
through interest rates and exchange rates described above, and reduce fiscal multipliers 
further. The impact of higher prices is more ambiguous, since they can have opposite 
effects on nominal and real wealth. 
     5 
Finally, dynamic effects of fiscal policy have to be considered (Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff, 1987). If crowding-out takes longer to manifest than the direct impact effect 
of a fiscal expansion, fiscal multipliers are likely to be relatively large in the short term 
but then to decline over time. In particular, the wage price-loop, which determines the 
rapidity of age increases in response to a fiscal expansion, and the responsiveness of 
trade volumes to changes in the domestic currency price of imports and exports, will 
influence the size of short-term fiscal multipliers. 
 
2.2. Demand-Side Effects of Fiscal Policy: Non-Keynesian Effects 
 
  Non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy emerge from new classical models which 
address the well-known shortcomings of the Keynesian approach, and in particular its 
lack of microeconomic foundations. While new classical models place considerable 
emphasis on the supply-side effects of fiscal policy, the focus here is on the features of 
some new classical models (i.e., those that do not assume full market clearing) with 
demand-side implications. An important consequence of non-Keynesian effects is that 
they can lead to negative fiscal multipliers, which at last could make fiscal adjustments 
to have an expansionary effect  of economic activity, instead of their traditional 
recessionary impact. 
   
While some variants of the Keynesian approach recognize the role of 
expectations (e.g., on consumption in life cycle and permanent income models), they 
typically rely on adaptive expectations. By comparison, rational expectations tend to 
bring forward adjustments in variables that would occur more progressively with 
adaptive expectations. Thus the longer-term effects of fiscal policy will matter even in 
the short-term, and in this connection the distinction between temporary and permanent 
policy changes is important. For example, while a temporary fiscal expansion that has 
no long-term effects will not influence expectations, a permanent fiscal expansion can 
add to crowding-out (possibly to an extent that fiscal multipliers turn negative) because 
households and firms will expect that an initial increase in interest rates and 
appreciation of the exchange rate will persist and could become larger (Krugman and 
Obstfeld, 1987). The opposite effect applies then for a fiscal adjustment that is 
perceived as permanent. As I will show later, empirical evidence suggests that a   6 
crowding-in following the episodes of fiscal adjustment in the European Union has 
occurred thanks to the perception by private agents that consolidations would be 
permanent. 
   
The Keynesian approach is based on an assumption that consumption is related 
to current income. If consumers are Ricardian, in the sense that they are forward-
looking, and are fully aware of the government’s intertemporal budget constraint, they 
will anticipate that a tax cut today, financed by higher debt, will result in higher taxes 
being imposed on themselves and/or their children in the future. Permanent income is 
therefore unaffected, and in the absence of liquidity constraints and with perfect capital 
markets, consumption will not change (Barro, 1974). Thus there is Ricardian 
equivalence between taxes and debt. Ricardian equivalence implies that a reduction in 
government saving resulting from a tax cut is fully offset by higher private saving and 
bequests, and aggregate demand is not affected. The fiscal multiplier is zero in this case. 
Nevertheless, if taxes are not lump-sum but progressive, financing the deficit through 
tax increases or debt will not have the same impact. At last, it is important to note that 
Ricardian equivalence is based on strong assumptions. Thus short time horizons, less 
than perfect foresight, partial liquidity constraints, imperfect capital markets, and non-
altruistic desire  to pass some of the current fiscal burden to future generations can 
reestablish a stronger link between fiscal policy and consumption. Consequently, the 
practical significance of Ricardian equivalence is problematic, at least in its perfect 
form. 
   
Finally, another, perhaps more important, channel through which debt 
accumulation may affect the fiscal multiplier relates to risk premia on interest rates. As 
government debt builds up with fiscal expansion(s), risk premia that reflect the 
mounting risk of default or increasing inflation risk will reinforce crowding out effects 
through interest rates (Miller, Skidelsky, and Weller, 1990). Under such circumstances, 
a temporary fiscal expansion will be more effective than a permanent one, because it 
poses less risk of undermining debt sustainability. In this context, policy credibility is 
crucial. If there is little faith in the government’s ability to reverse a temporary spending 
increase or tax cut because it lacks a track record of fiscal prudence, and the expectation 
is that a fiscal expansion which is announced to be temporary will in fact turn out to be 
permanent, then interest rate will most likely reflect risk premia. Sizable risk premia   7 
represent perhaps the clearest reason that fiscal multipliers could turn negative, because 
private spending responds positively to a credible commitment to debt reduction and a 
lowering of risk premia. This is one of the main explanations for expansionary fiscal 
contractions given by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Alesina and Perotti (1997). As 
this paper shows too, it was in countries that started fiscal adjustments in conditions of 
fiscal stress and subsequently with high risk premia,  where decisive cuts in welfare 
spending sent a signal of credible commitment to deficit reduction and produced a 
crowding-in effect that resulted in non-Keynesian effects and expansionary fiscal 
adjustments.  
   
2.3. Supply-Side Effects of Fiscal Policy 
 
  The analysis of the stabilization role of fiscal policy traditionally focuses on its 
demand-side effects, while supply-side effects are seen as more important over the 
longer-term. However, the distinction between short-term demand-side concerns and 
longer-term supply-side issues may not be so clear. If the economy is operating at full 
capacity  and productive capacity cannot be increased in the short-term, a fiscal 
expansion (which may be undertaken on the assumption that there is excess capacity or 
for political reasons) has to be crowded-out. Only policies that promote supply-side 
responses can address capacity constraints, and their impact is primarily longer term. 
However, supply-side effects of fiscal policy can have short-term demand-side 
consequences because of expectations that longer-term growth will be higher. If a fiscal 
adjustment is imparted through tax increases and spending cuts that are good for the 
supply side, this will tend to decrease fiscal multipliers, and the adjustment will be 
expansionary. 
   
In assessing the long-term impact of fiscal policy, attention should thus be paid 
to the way in which changes to labor income taxes affect the supply of labor, and 
changes to capital taxes affect saving and investment. The location of internationally 
mobile labor and capital can also be affected. In the final analysis, however, the impact 
of tax changes on the supply of labor and capital, and thus on growth, is an empirical 
issue about which clear-cut conclusions have yet to be provided (Blundell and 
MacCurdy, 1999). Attention should be also paid to the way in which spending on public 
goods and other goods with positive externalities can lead to higher growth, as is   8 
demonstrated in models where the government invests in both physical and human 
capital (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1989;  Lucas, 1988). 
   
Changing the emphasis, some attention has been given to the way in which labor 
market characteristics might influence whether changes in taxes and spending can have 
non-Keynesian effects through supply-side channels. In particular, Alesina and Perotti 
(1997) note that increases in labor income taxes can have a significant negative supply-
side impact in unionized, imperfectly competitive labor markets where before-tax 
wages, and hence labor costs, also increase to reflect the higher taxes. However they 
argue that an agreement on wage moderation with trade unions could limit the increase 
in before-tax wages, or inflationary pressures during a fiscal contraction accompanied 
by a sharp devaluation, thus reducing the fiscal multiplier and possibly contributing to 
non-Keynesian effects. Such an agreement is more likely with highly centralized 
unions. Lane and Perotti (1996) also argue that reductions in government employment 
(which reduce labor demand, weaken unions, lower wages, and thus increase 
profitability) can be a source of non-Keynesian effects. 
   
A final word should be dedicated here to new classical models. The distinctive 
feature of full-fledged new classical models is that prices clear markets, so that 
fluctuations in output are the result of supply-side shocks and not of changes in 
aggregate demand. One implication of new classical models, first highlighted by Lucas 
(1975) and Sargent and Wallace (1975), is that fully anticipated policies affecting 
aggregate demand (but not aggregate supply) have no effect on growth either in the 
short term or the longer term. Only unanticipated policies (which reflect either surprises 
by the government or imperfect information) have an effect, which emerges entirely 
through the supply side. This does not mean that these models are silent on fiscal policy. 
However, they focus on the design of optimal fiscal policy, as distinct from the impact 






   9 
2.4. Preliminary Empirical Evidence 
 
  From the previous theoretical review, most predictions regarding the effect of 
fiscal policy on the macroeconomy remain ambiguous. The purpose of the following 
empirical sections is to disentangle these ambiguities. To start doing so, table 1 reports 
bilateral Spearman correlations between the common two measures of fiscal policy (the 
annual change in the primary budget balanced, corrected and non corrected by the 
economic cycle), and different measures of economic policy outcomes (GDP growth, 
unemployment, inflation and income distribution
4).  
 










Strength  Fiscal 
Adjustment 
Var. Prim. Budget. Bal  1       
Var. CycAdj.Prim.B.Bal  0.77***  1     
Quality of Budget  0.16***  0.15***  1   
Strength of Adjustment  0.74***  0.93***  0.22***  1 
         
Var. Real GDP Growth  0.14***  -0.17***  0.10***  -0.13*** 
Var. Unemploymt Rate  -0.24***  0.04  -0.06  -0.06 
Var. Prices  0.03  0.12***  -0.12***  0.04 
Var. Inequality  0.18***  0.24***  0.16***  0.21*** 
 
The inclusion of this last variable is new in the literature on the economic impact 
of fiscal adjustments. Taking into account that parties formulate their fiscal policy 
aware of its distributive consequences (Mulas-Granados, 2002, 2003), it is crucial to 
ascertain whether these policies achieve the results they intend or not. In addition, two 
other variables from (Maroto and Mulas-Granados, 2002) are included in the table, 
measuring the quality of the budget
5 and the strength of the adjustment
6, since strong 
                                                 
4 Inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient. Data has been obtained from the World Income 
Inequality Database of the United Nations (2000), and has been completed for some years and some 
countries with the database from the Luxembourg Income Study Group (2001). Overlapping three-year 
moving averages have been used to fill out the gaps in the series. The Gini coefficient  as expressed in 
these databases runs from 0 to 100. It is 0 when the distribution of income is completely egalitarian, and it 
is 100 when it is completely inegalitarian and one person holds all the income in a society. See Appendix 
2  for a detailed explanation of the Gini coefficient. 
5 The quality of the budget measures the contribution of cyclically adjusted primary expenditures to the 
total amelioration of the budget balance. See Maroto and Mulas-Granados (2002) for a more detailed 
definition of this variable. 
6 The strength of the adjustment measures in absolute terms the distance between the annual change in the 
cyclically adjusted primary budget balance and the 1.5% adjustment threshold beyond which a 
consolidation is considered to be taking place.   10 
expenditure-based adjustments are expected to increase the sustainability of the 
consolidation episode, and their economic consequences can be more acute. 
 
Simple bilateral correlations in table 1 provide m any interesting findings. 
Economic growth is negatively associated with fiscal adjustments and specially if those 
are strong, since strong adjustments give the private sector less chances to completely 
replace the public sector in the areas where it has unexpectedly withdrawn its activity. 
Nevertheless, economic growth is positively correlated with better quality of the budget, 
which would imply that adjustments based on spending cuts are more likely to be 
expansionary. Unemployment is negatively associated to improvements in the budget 
balance, since higher unemployment means less public revenues and more expenditures. 
By contrast, prices are positively associated to improvements in the budget balance, 
meaning that monetary easing and fiscal adjustment work together. Finally, inequality is 
positively associated to improvements in the budget balance.  
 
These results point toward the existence of an important trade off between 
economic growth and income distribution that is mediated by fiscal policy. The idea of 
a trade off between growth and equality was deeply developed in the framework of 
neoclassical economics at the beginning of the past century, but still seems to hold 
pretty well today when fiscal policy is under discussion. The reasoning behind this trade 
off is that if the State is going to intervene to redistribute income, it will impose taxes 
that will distort the sound functioning of efficient markets, which in turn will discourage 
private investment and will have a decisive negative impact on productivity and 
economic growth (Przeworski, 1986; Boix, 1996). Therefore public transfers of income 
and capital from the richer strata to the poorer strata of any economy would only be 
sustainable in the long run as long as the associated taxes do not damage domestic 
productivity and the capital’s net rate of return. If the productivity and the rate of return 
are positive and higher than in other countries with lower taxes, investors will still 
remain in the country. Both conditions are necessary to maintain growth in the long-run 
with considerable public spending. In fact, these are the conditions that have supported 
the generous welfare states in Europe until today.  
 
The existence of this trade off between growth and redistribution was widely 
accepted under the paradigm of neoclassical economics up to the point that socialist   11 
governments in the twenties were willing to abandon redistributive policies if they 
harmed the medium term rate of economic growth (Boix, 1996). The substitution of this 
paradigm by the Keynesian one offered a way to escape that zero-sum game. Keynesian 
economics affirmed that economic growth was less a matter of supply conditions, and 
more a matter of aggregate demand. By stimulating aggregate demand, output would 
grow, and full employment could be reached, without very strong costs in terms of 
inflation. The combination of full employment policies and public spending expansion 
to stimulate domestic consumption, offered a combination of policies that were positive 
for both growth and equality. Once these policies proved no longer applicable in the 
seventies, basically due to the induced rigidities that they had generated in the aggregate 
supply, the neoclassical paradigm came again to dominate the landscape of economic 
ideas. EMU was conceived under its direct influence, and as the empirical evidence in 
this paper will show, it has coincided with a rebirth of the old trade off. With aggregate 
demand locked by means of a supranationalized monetary policy and the 3% deficit 
limit to fiscal policy, economic growth has become again a question of supply-side 
economics. For social democratic governments this means intervening in the provision 
of human and physical capital. For more conservative governments this means lowering 
the taxes that disincentive private investment, and reducing labor costs. In this 
framework again, direct transfers of income to the worse off (the very basis of the 
welfare state) are very much restricted by how much they damage the capital’s rate of 
return, and how much they affect productivity. When too much social spending reduces 
both, economic growth will be negatively affected and redistribution policies will not be 
sustainable. Then, expenditure-based fiscal adjustments that arrive in moments when 
budget deficits are harming productivity and private investment, are likely to increase 
economic growth (via positive supply-side effects associated to a crowding-in of private 
investment and consumption). However, this will be achieved at the cost of increasing  
income inequality.   
 
Only the IMF and the World Bank have systematically studied the effect of 
stabilization policies (that include serious fiscal adjustments) in developing countries on 
both growth and equality. Their studies almost always have concluded that successful 
stabilization experiences have increased economic growth and have reduced 
inequalities, normally as a “collateral effect” of the general economic stabilization, and 
sometimes also helped by World Bank’s poverty reduction programs (Tanzi, Chu, and   12 
Gupta, 1999). Nevertheless, the story for industrial countries seems to be somewhat 
different. Among the very few studies that have addressed the equity dimension of 
fiscal adjustments in advanced economies is the work by Ford (1998) and Smeeding 
(1997, 2000), who find that recent fiscal consolidations in OECD countries have run 
parallel to widening distribution of incomes and poverty increases. These results will be 
also confirmed by the empirical evidence presented in this paper. In fact, the continuous 
presence of the mentioned trade off between growth and equality, mediated by fiscal 
policy during episodes of expenditure-based consolidation becomes graphically very 
clear in figure 1, where results in terms of growth and equality are plotted against the 
amelioration of the budget balance through expenditure-based adjustments.  
 
Figure 1. Expenditure-based Fiscal Adjustments, and the Trade off between Growth 
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3. The Economic Impact of Fiscal Adjustments 
 
The preliminary evidence presented in the previous section allows the 
formulation of three hypotheses regarding the economic impact of different types of 
fiscal adjustments, be they revenue-based or expenditure-based adjustments. 
 
1-Fiscal adjustments can have Keynesian or anti-Keynesian effects on growth 
and employment, depending on the “good quality” composition of the adjustment. 
Expenditure-based adjustments are more likely to have expansionary anti-Keynesian 
effects, while revenue-based adjustments are more  likely to be associated with 
contractionary Keynesian effects. Initial fiscal conditions and accompanying monetary 
conditions are likely to be important in both cases. 
 
2-Even if expansionary fiscal adjustments are likely to occur under some 
specific circumstances, it remains unclear whether the “good quality” composition that 
generate them works through aggregate demand or aggregate supply.  
 
3-Finally, while some expenditure-based fiscal adjustments can be expansionary, 
they are also likely to increase income inequality. 
 
In order to test hypotheses 1 and 3, and to solve the open question in 2, I split the 
sample of 53 episodes of fiscal consolidation defined as those years in which the 
cyclically adjustment primary budget balance (CAPB) improved by at least 1.5% of 
GDP one year and was followed by a positive figure in the subsequent or preceding 
year, or when the CAPB improved at least 1.25% of GDP during two consecutive 
years
7. Using this standard definition to select episodes of fiscal adjustment, the sample 
of 53 cases is divided between 28 revenue-based adjustments and 25 expenditure-based 
adjustments.
8  
                                                 
7 This is the same criteria used for the selection of adjustment episodes in the most important papers in 
this field. See for example, Alesina-Ardagna (1998), Perotti and Kontopoulus (1998), Mulas-Granados 
(2002, 2003). Also see Alesina and Perotti (1997) and Maroto and Mulas-Granados (2002) for a 
discussion on the sensitivity of results to different fiscal adjustment definitions. 
8 An episode of fiscal adjustment is considered to be revenue-based when more than half of the 
contribution to average deficit reduction during the episode of adjustment comes from an increase in the 
average total revenues during the episode. The opposite applies to expenditure-based adjustments.   14 
 
Once this sample of adjustment episodes has been selected, I look at the average 
values of a wide range of economic variables two years before the adjustment, during 
the adjustment episode, and two years after the adjustment. The main reasons for 
looking only at two-year intervals before and after the consolidation episode have to do 
with the attempt to keeping as many data points as possible during the nineties (when 18 
of the 53 episodes occurred), and because in the longer term the relationship between 
fiscal adjustments and other economic variables is more difficult to identify , since the 
latter can be reflecting the impact of many other factors (Alesina and Ardagna, 1998). 
 
Fiscal adjustments can differ substantially, depending on whether they rely on 
increases in revenues or on spending cuts (Mulas-Granados, 2002, 2003). Table 2 is 
very illustrative in this respect. On the one hand revenue-based adjustments typically 
increase revenues from direct taxes to maintain public spending in public transfers, 
public wages, and public investment. On the other, expenditure-based adjustments rely 
mostly on cuts in transfers, wages and investment, and only increase direct taxes 
marginally during the adjustment. This slight increase in revenues coming from direct 
taxation is however immediately reversed once the adjustment has ended and the size of 
public expenditures in terms of total GDP has been reduced.  
 
It is important to note that expenditure-based adjustments take place when the 
initial fiscal conditions are very deteriorated. This confirms the findings of Von Hagen, 
Hallet and Straucht (2001) who showed that the probability of starting a  fiscal 
adjustment raised when the public debt increased. The debt to GDP ratio, the level of 
expenditures and the overall budget deficit are systematically higher in the two years 
previous to expenditure-based adjustments. This implies that governments facing strong 
fiscal imbalances, created by high public transfers and wages that cannot be financed by 
total revenues, are more likely to undertake a fiscal adjustment based on spending cuts. 
The amelioration of the debt-to-GDP ratio, the reduction of total expenditures, and the 
improvement of the budget balance is remarkable after the adjustment episode in cases 
of expenditure-based adjustments, while it is more moderate in cases of revenue-based 
adjustments. In the latter cases, once the budget deficit is under control and t he 
consolidation episode comes to an end, the increase in revenues that made the 
adjustment possible is then used to finance further increases in public transfers, wages   15 
and investment. These two different strategies have been generally associated to 
governments with different economic preferences regarding the role that the public 
sector should play in the economy (Mulas-Granados, 2002). These two different 
strategies, however, may not be neutral (Garcia and Hénin, 1999), in the sense that they 
may not have the same economic results. 
 
Table 2. Initial Fiscal Conditions, Budget Composition and Strategies of Fiscal 
Adjustments, 1960-2000  
 
   Non-Adjust.           Adjustment        
         Revenue-Based          Expenditure-Based    
         Before  During  After     Before  During  After 
                   
Fiscal Policy                   
                   
Debt Ratio  47.44   55.05  61.60  60.37   59.62  69.26  65.11 
Var. Debt Ratio  0.87   2.32  2.34  1.03   4.36  1.67  0.04 
                   
Budget Balance  -1.60   -4.41  -3.41  -2.95   -6.34  -4.11  -3.33 
Var. Budget Balance  -0.29   -0.99  0.96  -0.32   -1.03  1.53  0.19 
                   
Total Revenues  39.19   40.89  43.22  44.89   46.18  46.48  44.09 
Var. Total Revenues  0.36   0.58  1.41  -0.08   0.22  0.78  -0.42 
Total Direct Taxes  12.10   12.60  13.59  14.04   13.24  14.07  13.27 
Var. T. Direct Taxes  0.20   0.17  0.56  0.01   -0.03  0.31  -0.23 
                 
Total Expenditures  41.08   45.34  46.50  47.75   52.30  51.59  48.12 
Var. Total Expenditures  0.68   1.41  0.41  0.05   1.46  -0.81  -0.18 
Total Transfers  14.60   15.75  16.46  16.23   17.75  17.25  16.46 
Var. T. Transfers  0.33   0.43  0.42  0.22   0.40  -0.34  -0.28 
Total Public Wages  11.26   11.28  11.28  11.63   12.67  12.37  11.68 
Var. T. Public Wages  0.23   0.13  0.06  0.03   0.13  -0.29  0.04 
Total Pub. Investment  3.33   3.54  3.28  3.42   3.48  2.82  2.72 
Var. T. P. Investment  0.06   0.06  -0.10  0.03   -0.01  -0.24  0.02 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
 
As shown in table 3, GDP growth, unemployment, inflation, and inequality 
behave very differently depending on the type of adjustment implemented. Starting with 
initial conditions, it is worth noting that GDP growth is lower before expenditure-based 
adjustments than before revenue-based ones, and both are smaller than during years of 
non-adjustment. The same happens with unemployment and inflation rates. This means   16 
that governments decide to undertake expenditure-based adjustments when domestic 
macroeconomic conditions have worsened considerably, probably because it is only 
then when the public opinion is willing to accept the welfare cuts associated to 
expenditure-based adjustments. As an example, the average unemployment rate before 
expenditure-based adjustments is 2.5 percentage points higher than before revenue-
based ones.  In the cases of inflation rate and GDP growth, these differences are around 
3% and 0.5%, higher and lower respectively.  
 
Table 3. Macroeconomic Outcomes of Fiscal Adjustments, 1960-2000  
 
   Non-Adjust.           Adjustment        
         Revenue-Based          Expenditure-Based    
         Before  During  After     Before  During  After 
                   
Macroeconomic Outcomes                   
                   
Real GDP Growth  3.72   2.19  1.61  3.16   1.73  2.46  3.36 
Var. Real GDP Growth  -0.11   -0.50  -0.11  0.50   -0.19  0.50  0.56 
                   
Unemployment Rate  5.32   6.14  7.02  6.96   8.76  9.08  8.41 
Var. Unemployment Rate  0.08   0.25  0.55  -0.02   0.63  0.04  -0.45 
                   
Price Index  73.33   91.76  116.56  128.86   117.89  133.50  120.93 
Inflation Rate  3.71   6.80  7.03  6.70   9.36  7.53  6.75 
                   
Inequality Index  30.56   29.86  30.90  31.51   30.84  33.31  34.15 
Var. Inequality Index  0.12    0.04  0.10  0.19    0.03  0.31  0.47 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Increased growth follows after both revenue-based and expenditure-based 
consolidations. However, during revenue-based consolidations there is a typical 
Keynesian temporary recession that increases unemployment, and reduces the growth 
rate, while the opposite happens during expenditure-based adjustments. During and 
after the latter, growth increases and unemployment is reduced. In the same way, 
inflation remains constant during and after revenue-based consolidations, but decreases 
considerably in cases of expenditure-based adjustments.  
 
Nevertheless, not everything is positive in favor of expenditure-based 
adjustments. Fiscal consolidations that rely on spending cuts have higher costs in terms   17 
of income inequality than do revenue-based ones. As figure 1 illustrated and table 3 
clearly shows now, inequality increases during and after both types of fiscal 
adjustments, but it is during and after expenditure-based adjustments when the Gini 
coefficient grows more dramatically, indicating important increases in income 
inequality. The reasoning behind this fact is straightforward. Since welfare systems 
across Europe consist, roughly speaking, on tax collection through progressive-tax 
systems, in order to finance the social transfers to the worse-off, fiscal adjustments that 
reduce taxes and public expenditures by a greater amount, have the double effect of 
undermining the main source of income progressivity (progressive direct taxation), and 
withdrawing resources from programs that are targeted to the poorer people in each 
society. 
 
These results confirm the latest findings by the most prominent authors in the 
area
9, who have found at the end of the nineties important increases in income 
inequality. In fact, already in one of their initial papers on the topic, Alesina and Perotti 
(1996) raised the point that it was maybe due to the possible inequality consequences of 
fiscal adjustments why European governments were traditionally so reluctant to 
undertake expenditure-based adjustments. In fact, besides the possible ideological 
aversion that some political parties (mainly social democratic ones) may have 
traditionally had toward income inequality, lies also the fact that the electorate tends to 
punish incumbent governments if during their mandate inequality has increased (Mulas-
Granados, 2003b).  
 
So far, the empirical evidence presented until now in tables 2 and 3 supports the 
argument that expansionary fiscal adjustments occur primarily when initial fiscal and 
economic conditions have worsened considerably (high debt-to-GDP ratios, high budget 
deficits, high inflation and unemployment rates, and low GDP growth), and when the 
adjustment is expenditure-based (cutting public transfers, public wages, and 
investment)
10. These expenditure-based adjustments, although they can be expansionary 
                                                 
9 Gottchalk, Gustaffson, and Palmer (1997); Danzinger and Reid (1999); Ford (1998); Atkinson (2000); 
Smeeding (2000); and Freeman (2000). 
10 Note that these results are very similar to those reported by Alesina and Ardagna (1998), and all other 
similar studies collected in Appendix 1. Note also that the importance of bad initial fiscal conditions in 
generating expansionary fiscal adjustments, while very much stressed in studies dealing with advanced 
economies such as (Perotti, 1999; Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano, 2000), has been also corroborated in 
studies dealing with low-income countries (Gupta, Clements, Baldacci and Mulas-Granados, 2002).   18 
and increase economic growth, have  important costs in terms of increasing income 
inequality.  
 
But if hypotheses 1 and 3 at the beginning of this section have been already 
confirmed, it remains unclear whether the budget’s composition and initial economic 
conditions are the only factors behind expansionary fiscal adjustments; it can be the 
case that the size of the adjustment
11 and the accompanying monetary conditions can 
also play a role in generating the economic expansion. Furthermore, it remains to be 
clarified whether these expansionary fiscal adjustments work primarily through supply-
side or demand-side mechanisms. 
 
In relation to the question of size of the adjustment, there may be a role for this 
as a factor generating expansionary fiscal consolidations, since the difference between 
the figures for the budget balance “after” and “before” adjustment is bigger in the case 
of expenditure-based expansionary fiscal adjustments than in the caser of revenue-based 
ones (meaning that the budget deficit is reduced more in the former than in the latter 
case). However, this effect does not seem to be very important because the differences 
are small in comparison: expenditure-based adjustments reduce the budget deficit by 2 
average percentage points, while revenue-based adjustments reduce the budget deficit 
by 1.5 percentage points.   
 
The question of accompanying monetary conditions does seem to play a role too, 
but again a very limited one. As can be seen in table 4, both types of fiscal adjustments 
are usually accompanied by a nominal devaluation (an increase in the exchange rate). 
This devaluation is however maintained after expenditure-based consolidations but 
reversed after revenue-based ones. With respect to short-term real interest rates, there 
seems to be no differences in their behavior across types of adjustment, since they 
remain more or less constant before and during the adjustment, and they only fall after 
expenditure-based ones, reflecting the lower risk premia. Therefore, the story of 
expansionary fiscal adjustments seems to be based more on the composition of the 
budget, than on the size of the budget cut or the simultaneous expansion of monetary 
                                                 
11 Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) argue that a large adjustment, by inducing a permanent change of fiscal 
regime, can be expansionary because expectations are less susceptible to be affected by smaller 
adjustments.   19 
conditions. It is true that monetary policy was slightly more relaxed during and after 
expenditure-based expansionary adjustments, but this can also be reflecting the fact that 
almost all expenditure-based fiscal consolidations that took place in the nineties started 
right after the monetary storms in the EMS during 1992-93. 
 
Table 4. Monetary Policy and Fiscal Adjustments, 1960-2000  
 
   Non-Adjust.           Adjustment        
         Revenue Based          Expenditure Based    
         Before  During  After     Before  During  After 
                   
Monetary Policy                   
                   
Real Interest Rate (ShTerm)  1.85   3.02  3.11  3.11   3.04  2.95  2.62 
Var. Real Interest Rate  0.07   -0.44  -0.11  0.41   0.30  -0.17  -0.02 
Real Interest Rate (G4)  -0.14   -0.54  -0.47  -0.74   -0.50  -0.30  -0.22 
                   
Real Exchange Rate  99.06   101.18  102.75  101.11   97.19  97.89  96.62 
Var. Real Exchange Rate  -0.07    -0.27  0.50  -0.69    -0.12  0.64  0.87 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Once the macroeconomic results that different types if fiscal adjustments bring 
about have been described, and once the type of initial and accompanying fiscal and 
monetary conditions that influence those final outcomes have become clear, the last step 
in this analysis is then to investigate the channels through which expansionary fiscal 
adjustments work. As can be observed in table 5, economic expansion after expenditure-
based fiscal consolidations is mediated by a remarkable crowding-in of the private 
sector in the form of increasing consumption and a boom of private investment.  
 
This crowding-in is also present in revenue-based adjustments but is much less 
important
12. This important crowding-in of the private sector in expansionary 
expenditure-based consolidations is accompanied by higher profits and lower labor 
costs, which are at last translated into an improvement of the trade balance. The 
argument b ehind the reduction in labor costs that improves the budget balance, 
increases profits and investment, thus contributing to an increase in the level of output is 
the following: during expenditure-based adjustments, the government wage bill is 
                                                 
12 See Argimón, González-Páramo, and Roldán (1997) for similar evidence on crowding-in after fiscal 
adjustments.   20 
reduced and there are no increases in direct taxes (that principally rely on the labor 
factor). Both measures have the effect of reducing labor costs directly and indirectly by 
undermining the bargaining power of labor unions. 
 
Table 5. Microeconomic Outcomes, Trade Policy Outcomes, and Fiscal 
Adjustments, 1960-2000 
  
  Non-Adjust.           Adjustment        
         Revenue Based          Expenditure Based    
         Before  During  After     Before  During  After 
                   
Microeconomic Outcomes                   
                   
Private Consumption  57.80   57.93  58.32  58.09   57.95  58.39  58.97 
Var. Private Consumption  -0.09   -0.07  0.19  0.03   -0.02  0.23  0.37 
                   
Private Investment  18.66   17.63  18.22  18.01   17.35  18.16  19.26 
Var. Private Investment  0.02   -0.03  0.49  -0.40   0.05  0.55  0.76 
                   
Labor Costs Index  107.08   108.88  108.02  105.43   108.20  104.86  101.83 
Var. Labor Costs  -0.13   0.48  -0.49  -1.39   -0.98  -1.85  -1.54 
                   
Profits Share  31.84   31.77  31.06  31.88   31.10  32.31  32.92 
Var. Profits Share  0.04   0.05  0.02  0.09   0.03  0.72  0.31 
                   
Trade Policy Outcomes                   
                   
Imports  29.60   35.99  35.50  36.60   36.34  35.86  37.44 
Var. Imports  0.80   0.47  0.33  1.54   0.74  0.94  1.10 
Exports  21.46   24.06  24.13  26.01   25.80  28.51  29.08 
Var. Exports  0.65   0.34  0.61  0.77   0.87  1.08  1.15 
                   
Trade Balance  -0.36   -1.41  -0.25  -0.30   -1.77  0.67  0.68 
Var. Trade Balance  -0.08    -0.20  -0.02  -0.11    0.31  0.95  0.20 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
The truth is that this mechanism of diminishing labor costs that trigger 
expansionary fiscal adjustments should not be uniquely associated to expenditure-based 
fiscal adjustments. In fact, this mechanism would also work for revenue-based fiscal 
adjustments if trade unions internalized the government’s budget constraint, or if they 
did not ask for an increase in real salaries when taxes grew. This only happens in 
countries such as the United States or Canada, where trade unions are almost inexistent,   21 
or in countries such as the Scandinavian ones, where the high degree of corporatism and 
a c entralized wage bargaining process have traditionally made trade unions 
encompassing and collaborative with the government’s budget constraint, and have thus 
permitted social democratic governments to balance their budgets via revenues without 
damaging labor costs, domestic productivity and economic growth (Alesina and 
Ardagna, 1998; Alesina, Perotti and Tavares, 1998; Garrett 1998, and Esping-Andersen, 
1995, 1996, 1999). In other countries, trade unions are strong enough to protest and 
demand higher salaries, but not enough to be able to control all wage demands across 
different sectors of the economy, that can bring about a concertation at the national 
level
13. This is what has given expenditure-based adjustments the monopoly in reducing 
labor costs and generating expansionary fiscal adjustments, while revenue-based 
adjustments can only have these effects in countries with a very strong corporatist 
tradition. 
 
Summing up, what the empirical evidence presented in this section has shown 
can be grouped in three different sets of conclusions, that confirm the three initial 
hypotheses that were stated at the beginning of the section: 
 
1-In the short-run, the composition of fiscal adjustments is a crucial factor 
determining the economic consequences of consolidation episodes. Expenditure-based 
adjustments normally take place in situations of fiscal stress, with low GDP growth, 
high debt levels, strong budget deficits and poor initial economic performance. When 
these consolidations succeed in reducing the most rigid items of the budget, namely 
public transfers and public wages, they are expansionary. Their economic effects are to 
increase GDP growth, and reduce inflation and unemployment rates, but they do so at 
the cost of increasing income inequality more than what revenue-based adjustments do. 
Note that these results are important for two strands of the economic literature: the one 
on the growth-equality trade-off, and the one related to growth theory. With respect to 
the latter, these results are particularly important since they provide further evidence of 
the role that endogenous growth theories give to fiscal policy
14 in generating growth. In 
                                                 
13 According to Alesina and Perotti (1997b), in such cases where trade unions are not weak nor strong 
enough, a 1% increase in the income tax, increases labor costs in 2%. 
14 Previously to endogenous growth models, the neoclassical growth models of Solow (1956) and Swan 
(1956) rejected a direct connection between fiscal policy and growth. In their view, the share of 
government expenditure in output, or the composition of expenditure and revenue, can influence the   22 
endogenous growth models (Barro, 1990 and 1991; Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995; and 
Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti and Asea, 1997), investment in physical and human capital 
can affect both the level of output and the steady-state growth rate. Taxes that affect the 
investment decision (thus labelled as distortionary) can create tax wedges and thus 
diminish the rate of growth. And expenditures that are included as arguments in the 
private production function (thus classified as productive) can have a direct positive 
impact on the steady-state rate of growth
15. Also, in this respect Kneller, Bleaney and 
Gemmel (1999: 171) affirm that: “(1) distortionary taxation reduces growth whilst non-
distortionary does not; and (2) productive government expenditure enhances growth, 
whilst non-productive expenditure does not”
16. 
 
2-When fiscal adjustments are expansionary, non-Keynesian effects work 
through both demand-side and supply-side mechanisms. 
 
a)  With respect to demand-side mechanisms, this section has provided 
evidence of the existence of wealth effects, given that a cut in public 
consumption that is perceived as permanent increases private 
consumption, because households discount future higher levels of 
disposable income as a result of the expected reduction in taxes. 
 
b)  There are also credibility effects that benefit both private consumption 
and private investment. When debt is high, interest rates are high and 
any deficit reduction, mostly if it is based on spending cuts, reduces the 
risk premia, and consequently interest rates, facilitating the crowding-
in of private consumption and investment.
17 
 
                                                                                                                                               
savings rate or the incentive to invest in physical or human capital, but they cannot affect the long-run 
rate of growth. Fiscal policy cannot affect the growth rate because it is driven by exogenous factors of 
population growth and technological change. See Judd (1985), and Chamley (1986). 
15 See Gerson (1998) for an extensive review of the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship 
between taxation and government expenditure and economic growth.  
16 For similar conclusions  see also Aschauer (1989); Barro (1990, 1991); King and Rebelo (1990); 
Easterly and Rebelo (1993); Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993); Easterly, Rodríguez, and Schmidt-Hebbel, 
1994; and Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmel (2000). 
17 Note that the size of the increase  in private consumption depends on the absence of liquidity-
constrained consumers (Alesina and Ardagna, 1998), and therefore, as noted by Perotti (1999), the result 
hinges on the efficiency of financial markets, and should be stronger when fiscal consolidation occurs in 
bad times when the debt-to-GDP ratio is growing rapidly. For similar previous arguments in this respect, 
see also Blanchard (1990) and Bertola and Drazen (1993).   23 
c)  And with respect to the supply-side, the reduction in the government 
wage-bill in unionized imperfectly labor markets proves crucial to 
reduce labor costs, to increase business’s profits, and to improve the 
trade balance, thus contributing to the economic expansion. 
 
3- Finally, the choice that governments planning to undertake a fiscal adjustment 
face seems to lie between two extremes: one option is to undertake a revenue-based 
adjustment that may not be so expansionary but that will prevent income inequality 
from raising dramatically; and an alternative option is to pursue an expenditure-based 
strategy that may be expansionary but at the cost of increasing inequalities substantially. 
As shown by Mulas-Granados (2002, 2003) this decision is heavily influenced by the 
rate of unemployment, by the structural budget balance in previous years, by the 
electoral calendar, by the fragmentation of the cabinet, and most importantly, by the 
ideology of the party in government.  
 
4. The Economic Impact of Fiscal Adjustments During the Nineties 
 
  During the nineties, the dynamics presented in previous sections can be applied 
without any major revision. Revenue-based adjustments and expenditure-based ones 
have had similar characteristics than those from previous decades
18. Similarly, they 
have also had opposite economic consequences, in the short-run. While expenditure-
based adjustments in the nineties have shown better chances of increasing economic 
growth, revenue-based ones have proved less likely to increase income inequality. 
   
The driving forces leading to expansionary fiscal adjustments during the nineties 
have also been a mix of supply-side and demand-side mechanisms of wealth effects, 
investment boom and credibility effects. The process of strong deficit reduction in 
Europe, and the downward convergence of interest rates, maintained inflation at 
historically low levels, and this curbed unit labor costs down following expenditure-
based adjustments. The trade balance improved, and private investment and 
consumption boomed, increasing the GDP growth rate in the EU up to a point that made 
European leaders affirm at the Lisbon European Summit of 2000 that the objective for 
                                                 
18 For details on fiscal policy, monetary policy, microeconomic outcomes, and trade policy outcomes 
during the nineties, see Appendix 3.    24 
2010 should be to become the most competitive and developed knowledge-based 
economy in the world.  
 
Furthermore, the decade of the nineties shows some of  the most salient and 
paradigmatic cases of expansionary fiscal consolidations. Among them Italy and Spain. 
In the first case, after the strong devaluations that made the lira exit the EMS in 1992, 
the sustained fiscal adjustment that took place during the whole decade of the nineties 
multiplied the credibility effects that served as the basis for their posterior economic 
growth. The pension reform implemented in 1995 showed the commitment of the Italian 
government to making fiscal balance a durable policy, and became the turning point for 
the Italian government in gaining the credibility of markets and private agents. The 
subsequent decrease in interest rates boosted private investment and served as the basis 
for the economic growth of the second half of the decade
19. In this respect, the 
announcement of future reimbursement of the special tax that the government levied to 
qualify for the third stage of EMU, was crucial for not losing again the credibility of 
private agents. If the tax was to be returned in the future, it indicated that the fiscal 
discipline would have to be even tighter than before. 
 
The Spanish case was somewhat different because its debt-to-GDP ratio was not 
as astonishingly high as the Italian one, and therefore the crowding-in of the private 
sector came through a wealth effect channel, instead of through a credibility effect 
mechanism. The turning points in this case were the reform of the unemployment 
benefits system of 1994 and the freezing of public wages in 1997. Both decisions 
showed the strong commitment of both the Socialist and the Popular governments to 
comply with the Maastricht criteria and to qualify with the first group joining the euro. 
These measures, together with the 1992, 1993, and 1995 devaluations of the peseta 
increased the competitiveness of Spanish exports that led the economic recovery during 
the three years following the 1992 economic recession. After that, the systematic 
reduction in interest rates following the fiscal effort made by the government (based on 
cuts in  public consumption, transfers, and public investment) was the main factor 
driving the private investment and consumption booms responsible for the second 
strongest economic rate of growth in Europe during the second half of the nineties. 
                                                 
19 I thank Marco Buti, Head of the Public Finances Division of the European Commission, for providing 
me with the detailed insights of the Italian experience.   25 
   
Similar examples can in fact be found all across Europe. As Von Hagen, Hallet 
and Strauch (2001), and Gemmell and Kneller (2001) show, the story of expansionary 
fiscal adjustments applies specially well in the nineties
20. And this was so because the 
Maastricht criteria came to impose a credible deficit reduction precisely when European 
countries faced some of their worst moments in terms of budget deficits and 
accumulated debts since the Second World War. The fact that the pre-consolidation 
fiscal stance was seen by private agents as unsustainable, in the sense that it would have 
required higher taxes to serve the public debt, explains why the adjustment episodes of 
the nineties had a positive expectation effect on forward-looking consumers and 
investors. These new expectations increased growth and employment despite the period 
of fiscal restraint. An easing of monetary policy coming from the devaluations triggered 
by the 1992-92 ERM crisis, and decreasing interest rates, also played a significant role 
in achieving these results. 
   
Table 6 below reports the results of replicating the model used by Von Hagen, 
Hallett and Strauch (2001) with my database, in order to answer if non-Keynesian 
effects in the nineties were stronger than those already identified by many authors for 
previous decades
21. This is done by  estimating a model for the interaction between  
fiscal policy, real output and monetary conditions, analyzed in a system of three 
endogenous variables. Replicating their procedures, I estimate the following model, 
including debt/DGP, long-term interest rate, both lagged one period, and the change in 
the EU-15 output gap
22 as exogenous variables.  
 
) , , , , ( , , 1 1 1 dummies DEBT GAP Y Y M F f F t t t t t t t D D D D = D - - -  
) , , , , ( 1 1 1 - - - D D D = D t t t t t t F Y i F M m M  
) , , , ( 1 1 1 t t t t t GAP M F Y y Y D D D D = D - - -  
   
                                                 
20 It is interesting to note that these findings with actual data reject the predictions made in the middle of 
the nineties by the same authors, when they predicted pronounced recessions as a consequence of the 
fiscal effort needed to fulfil the Maastricht criteria (see for example Von Hagen and Lutz, 1996). 
21 They apply their model to a sample of 19 OECD countries, while I replicate it with the sample of 15 
EU countries contained in the AMECO database of the European Commission. 
22 Measured as the difference between aggregate demand and potential output, as defined by the European 
Commission in the AMECO database. This variable was also used by Von Hagen, Hallett and Straucht 
(2001) for their analysis of the determinants of the probability of starting a consolidation.   26 
The GDP growth equation is characterized by output being dependent only on 
lagged fiscal or monetary policies, lagged output growth, and the change in the EU-15 
output gap. The monetary policy equation has the real monetary conditions index
23 
depending on its own lag, the change in the cyclically adjusted domestic  structural 
balance, and its lag, output growth, and the lag of long term interest rate. Finally, the 
fiscal policy equation describes the change in the cyclically adjusted domestic structural 
balance as a function of its own lag, current monetary policy, current and lagged 
domestic output growth, the EU-15 output gap, and the debt-GDP ratio. As they do, I 
also include country dummies in the fiscal policy equation only
24. 
   
This model is estimated using a “three-stage least squares estimator in order to 
take into account any cross correlation between the various residuals which may reflect 
some of the behavior of the variables which had to be omitted from the panel 
estimation. Robust standard errors were estimated to account for heteroskedasticity and 
any remaining serial correlation” (Von Hagen, Hallett and Strauch, 2001: 54)
25.  
   
As results in table 6 show
26, during the seventies and the eighties, GDP growth 
was strongly positively affected by its own lag, and by the surrounding cyclical 
conditions in the EU.  
 
It was negatively affected by monetary and fiscal contractions, although the 
coefficient for the change in the fiscal stance is not statistically significant. These effects 
were all reinforced in the nineties. GDP growth became even more dependent on its lag 
and on the average EU output gap, what reflects the growing interdependence of 
European economies, and it was also more negatively affected by monetary 
                                                 
23 As in Von Hagen, Hallett and Straucht (2001), the stance of monetary policy is measured by the 
Monetary Conditions Index built specifically for this purpose. The index is the sum of the short-term real 
interest rate and the real exchange rate, each weighted by its sample standard deviation. 
24 The results for the estimation of this equation are not shown in table 6, but they are available upon 
request. 
25 The ideal  specification for such a three equations system would have been a structural VAR system, 
but that was impossible to estimate given data limitations that ruled out the estimation of a model with 
sufficient lags for all variables. Instead I used, following Von Hagen, Hallett, and Straucht (2001), a 
simple partial reduced form system. 
26 Since the determinants of fiscal policy have been extensively analyzed in previous works (Perotti and 
Kontopoulus, 1998; Von Hagen, Hallett and Straucht 2001; Mulas-Granados, 2002), and the determinants 
of monetary policy lie outside the focus of this paper, and most importantly because the main focus of this 
paper is on the impact of fiscal policy on “growth vs. equality”, only results for the growth equation are 
reported in table 6. However, the results for the estimation of the other two equations are available upon 
request.    27 
contractions, meaning that devaluations and/or falling interest rates had a bigger 
positive impact in increasing growth during the nineties than they had before. But what 
is most striking is that the impact of fiscal consolidations on growth became much less 
negative during the nineties. Also, the positive impact that quality of the budget had on 
growth before 1990, was reinforced in the following decade. These two results confirm 
that non-Keynesian effects of expenditure-based fiscal consolidations applied even 
better during the nineties than in previous decades. 
 
Table 6. Expansionary Fiscal Adjustments. The 1990s in Perspective 
 
  Real GDP Growth 
(1970-1989) 
Real GDP Growth 
(1990-2000) 
     
























     
Observations  297  163 
Adj. R-squared  0.31  0.46 
LR Chi 2(7)  72.66  110.71 
Prob>Chi 2  0.000  0.000 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Nevertheless, the reverse side of this paradigmatic story of expansionary fiscal 
consolidations during the nineties w as the parallel process of growing income 
inequalities. As shown in table 7, the difference between the average increase in GDP 
growth after expenditure-based fiscal adjustments and revenue-based ones is bigger in 
the nineties than in previous decades (compare with results in table 3), meanwhile the 
increase in income inequalities after expenditure-based adjustments that took place 
during the nineties, was also more pronounced and continues to increase in the large 
majority of European nations   
   28 
Table 7. Macroeconomic Outcomes of Fiscal Adjustments, 1990-2000  
 
   Non-Adjust.           Adjustment        
         Revenue-Based          Expenditure-Based    
         Before  During  After     Before  During  After 
                   
Macroeconomic Outcomes                   
                   
Real GDP Growth  2.74   1.96  2.26  2.66   1.74  2.56  3.61 
Var. Real GDP Growth  0.01   0.03  -0.04  0.25   0.42  0.13  0.30 
                   
Unemployment Rate  8.54   8.24  8.42  9.10   9.35  8.84  8.82 
Var. Unemployment Rate  -0.03   0.21  0.21  -0.09   0.55  -0.08  -0.67 
                   
Price Index  163.69   155.88  193.75  212.96   172.81  170.31  162.85 
Inflation Rate  6.11   8.14  8.48  8.80   10.67  6.94  6.29 
                   
Inequality Index  32.43   30.60  31.08  31.41   29.30  30.28  34.64 
Var. Inequality Index  0.09    0.03  0.07  0.10    0.05  0.24  0.65 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Fiscal adjustments alone cannot be made the sole driving force responsible for 
the mentioned increase in income inequality during the nineties. The widening of the 
income distribution has been also exacerbated by two simultaneous factors, such as 
technological change that has increased the demand for highly paid skilled labour, and 
globalization of trade and production that has increased competition between low-paid 
workers in developing countries and the unskilled in industrialized ones (Ford, 1998). 
This is what has been named the “efficiency hypothesis” in some of the latest studies in 
globalization (Garrett, 1998; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001), according to which 
globalization of trade has imposed cuts in welfare spending as a means of  gaining 
external competitiveness. The result of all these changes has been a U-turn in the trend 
of income inequality among advanced economies. As shown in table 8, the downward 
trend in inequality that characterized the sixties and the seventies turned into an upward 
trend of increasing inequalities from the mid eighties until today. Although the turning 
point can be generally identified at the beginning of the eighties, it varies across nations. 
For example, Scandinavian countries did not experience a rise in inequality until the 
nineties, while in others such as Germany and France, these increases were fairly 
modest. 
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Table 8. Historical Trends in Income Distribution, 1970-2000 
 




Mid-Late 1980s to 
Mid-Late 1990s 
       
Austria  0  0  ++ 
Belgium  0  +  + 
Denmark      - 
France  -  0 (-)  + 
Finland  -  0  + 
Germany  -  +  + 
Greece      - 
Italy  - -  -  ++ 
Ireland      + 
Luxembourg       
The Netherlands  0  +  ++ 
Portugal      - 
Spain    -  + 
Sweden  -  +  + 
UK  ++  +++  ++ 
       
EU-15  -  0  + 
Source: Smeeding (2000: 26) 
Note: +++ (- - -) Significant rise/decrease in income inequality (more than 15%); ++ (- -) Moderate rise/decrease in 
income inequality (7%-14%); + Modest rise/decrease in income inequality (1%-6% increase); 0 No change (-1% to 
+1%). 
 
Nevertheless, besides the obvious impact that globalization has had in widening 
income distribution and increasing inequality, it is also evident that growing income 
inequality in the European Union has run parallel to significant cuts in social spending 
along the decade, accelerated and accentuated in the run-up to EMU. 
 
Some cases are specially relevant in this respect, such as Finland, Austria, Italy, 
the United Kingdom and Spain. In all of them, strong reductions of the relative share of 
social  spending to GDP were accompanied by remarkable increases in income 
inequality. On the other hand, Portugal and Greece offer the positive side of the story, 
with transfers being maintained or increased during the mid-nineties, and income 
inequality being reduced. 
 
There are some cases, however that do not fit exactly in the mentioned 
correlation between cuts in social transfers and increases in income inequality. France 
and Germany, for example, are two cases where income inequality increased in spite of 
moderate increases in transfers. While the German case is obviously explained by the 
process of German unification, and the effect of expanding the German Welfare State to 
the Eastern part of the country, the French case remains unclear. Something similar, but   30 
with an opposite sign, happened with Denmark, the only country were inequalities were 
importantly reduced during the nineties in spite of a serious retrenchment in public 
transfers.   
 
Table 9. Changes in Social Spending and Income Inequality, 1993-1997 (%GDP) 
 




  Major Transfers 
(Disaggregated Change) 
 








           
Austria  1.1  -0.6  0.3  0.4  -0.1 
Belgium  0.4  -1.2  -0.7  -0.3  -0.4 
Denmark  -1.6  -1.1  -2.1  0.1  -2.0 
France  0.1  0.2  -0.3  -0.1  -0.3 
Finland  1.4  -4.3  -2.5  -0.9  -1.6 
Germany  0.2  0.6  -0.1  0.1  -0.3 
Greece  -0.2  0.7  -0.1  -0.1  0.0 
Italy  1.5  -0.9  -0.4  -0.2  -0.2 
Ireland  0.4  -2.3  -0.6  0.0  -0.7 
Luxembourg  -0.2         
The Netherlands  0.5  -2.9  -1.2  -0.7  0.2 
Portugal  -0.2  0.7  -0.1  -0.2  0.0 
Spain  0.6  -2.3  -2.3  -0.1  -2.2 
Sweden  0.4  -3.5  -1.2  -0.4  -0.6 
UK  0.9  -1.3  -0.8  0.0  -0.8 
           
EU-15  0.3  -0.4 (^)  -0.6  -0.1  -0.5 
Source: Own elaboration. Data on social spending from EC (2001: 25). Data on Income Inequality from Smeeding 
(2000) and WIID (2000).  
Note: Figures show changes between 1993 and 1997, all measured in terms of GDP, except the change in income 
inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. 
(*) Includes unemployment, plus disability benefits, plus social assistance. 





The clearest and most comprehensive way to conclude this paper and summarize 
all the empirical evidence presented until now, is to affirm that different strategies of 
fiscal adjustment bring about different economic consequences. 
 
Expenditure-based adjustments that are preceded by bad economic and fiscal 
initial conditions, that are accompanied by a devaluation, and that succeed in cutting the 
least productive expenditures of the budget, are likely to have anti-Keynesian effects   31 
and to be expansionary. Nevertheless, they do so at the expense of increasing income 
inequality. The opposite is true for revenue-based consolidations. 
 
For expansionary fiscal adjustments to take place, demand-side effects in the 
form of crowding-in of the private sector, as well as supply-side effects in the form of 
lower labor costs and increased investment, usually take place simultaneously. The 
signal that expenditure-based adjustments send to private agents inform about the 
commitment of the government to a sustained fiscal effort, and this produces a 
credibility effect that is crucial for expansionary fiscal adjustments to take place. 
 
The nineties epitomize the story of expansionary fiscal consolidations, but also 
the rebirth of the trade-off between growth and equality, mediated by fiscal policy. 
Since the process of fiscal adjustment imposed by the Maastricht criteria arrived in a 
moment of special fiscal stress for public finances across Europe, credible spending cuts 
succeeded in attracting private investment and consumption, and therefore accelerated 
growth. However, the negative side of the strongest episode of fiscal adjustment in 
Europe in the last three decades has been the progressive widening of income 
distribution and the increase in inequalities that have reached in the nineties its higher 
levels as well. 
 
In this respect, the choice between revenue-based and expenditure-based 
adjustments has to be informed by their likely economic consequences shown in this 
paper, and this strategic decision is therefore subject to the concrete preferences over 
growth and equality that every government may have. 
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Appendix 1. The Empirical Literature on the Economic Impact of Fiscal Adjustments 
 










20 OECD countries, 
1970-95 
 
Primary structural balance 
improves by at least 1.5% of GDP 




Correlations of averages across 
groups of episodes 
Giavazzi and 
Pagano (1996) 
19 OECD countries, 
1970-92 
Any period when the primary 
structural balance moved in a 
consistent direction; a cumulative 
5 percentage point of GDP change 
marks a “large” consolidation. 
223  Panel regressions of consumption 
functions (error correction 
specification) 
OECD (1996)  All OECD countries, 
1975-95 
Primary structural balance 
improves by 3% of GDP in 
consecutive years. 
15  Correlations of averages across 





17 OECD countries, 
1970-94 
Continuous improvement in 
primary structural balance, 
including an “intense” subperiod. 
19  Correlations of averages across 
groups of episodes, consumption 




20 OECD countries, 
1960-94 
 
Primary structural balance 
improves by at least 1.5% of GDP 
in one year or 1.25% of GDP in 
two consecutive years. 
62 years of 
tight fiscal 
policy 
Correlations of averages across 




All OECD countries, 
1960-95 
Primary structural balance 
improves by 1.5% of GDP in two 
consecutive years. 
51, of which 23 
expansionary 
Correlations of averages across 




19 OECD countries, 
1960-95 
Primary structural balance 
improves by 1.5% GDP in one 
year. 
69, of which 
19 successful 
Correlations of averages across 






18 OECD countries, 
1960-96 
Primary structural balance 
improves by at least 2% of GDP 
in one year or 1.25% of GDP in 
two consecutive years. 
Not given  Correlations of averages across 
groups of episodes, investment 
equations from pooled 
regressions. 
Perotti (1999)  19 OECD countries, 
1965-94 
Not given  Not given  Panel regressions of consumption 





18 OECD countries, 
1970-96 
Not given  38 expansions 
65 contraction 
Panel regressions of national 
saving rates. 
Source: IMF (2000: 20-21) 
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Table A.1 (continuation). Cross-Section Studies of Expansionary Fiscal Contractions 
 
Authors  Main Evidence of Expansionary 
Contractions 







For successful consolidations, GDP growth 
rate relative to OECD average: -0.2% 
(before), 0.1% (during) and 0.7% (after) 
 
For expansionary 
contractions, mostly through 
investment; for debt-
increasing expansions, 
crowding-out of investment; 
for stable-debt expansions, 
growth via consumption 
 
Size is important, as composition; 
expenditure cuts (specifically 
transfers and government wages) 
more likely to be successful; timing 





For large/persistent consolidations, $1 
increase in taxes (cuts in transfers) raises 
private consumption by 15-20c in long run 
Private sector consumption 
(other channels not tested) 
Size and persistence most 
important; clearer effects for 
government spending but also for 
taxes and transfers. 
OECD 
(1996) 
Four of 15 consolidations had growth above 
potential and six were within 1% point of 
potential 
Not addressed  Supportive monetary policy helps 








Large retrenchments on average led to 
0.1% reduction in G-7 corrected growth, 
but small retrenchments led to 0.4% 
reduction. Non-Keynesian retrenchments 
had higher growth rate of private 
consumption than predicted by a standard 
consumption function. 





For successful consolidations, GDP growth 
rate relative to OECD average: -0.2% 
(before), 1.1%(during), and 0.3% (after) 
Emphasizes impact of unit 
labor costs and 
competitiveness, and hence 
on investment and exports. 




For expansionary contractions, GDP 
growth rate relative to G-7 average: 0.2% 
(before), 1.3% (during), and 0.9% (after). 
Emphasizes impact on unit 
labor costs and 
competitiveness, and hence 
on investment and exports. 
Composition more important than 
size; income policy and exchange 






For successful consolidations, GDP growth 
rate relative to OECD average: -0.3% 
(before), 0.1%(during), and 0.2% (after) 
Investment more important 
than consumption; labor 
market also important. 
Composition more important than 







1% cut in primary spending leads to 0.2% 
increase in investment after impact, and 
0.8% increase after 5 years, similar effects 
for 1% increase in labor taxes; larger effects 
for cuts in government wages. 
Tax and spending affect labor 
costs, and hence profits and 
investment. 
Composition is crucial. 
Perotti 
(1999) 
Expenditure shocks have Keynesian effects 
with low debt or deficits, but non-
Keynesian effects with high debt or 
deficits; evidence on similar switch with tax 
shocks is less strong. 
Private sector consumption 
(other channels not tested). 
Initial fiscal conditions are crucial; 





Non-Keynesian responses by private sector 




channels not tested) 
Size and persistence most 
important; but not initial fiscal 
conditions. Non-Keynesian effects 
larger for changes in taxes than 
spending, an for contractions rather 
than expansions. 
Source: IMF (2000: 20-21) 
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As can be observed from the previous summary, all studies identify 
expansionary fiscal adjustments. Growth rates tend to respond more favorably to 
episodes of successful fiscal consolidation
27 than do episodes of unsuccessful 
consolidation. The same is true of unemployment rates. However, the quantitative 
impact of fiscal consolidations (that is, the size of the associated –negative- multipliers) 
varies markedly across successful and unsuccessful consolidations. 
 
The characteristics of expansionary fiscal consolidations are no completely 
clear. Some studies as Cour, Dubois, Mahfouz, and Pisani-Ferry (1996), Giavazzi and 
Pagano (1996), and Giavazzi, Japelli, and Pagano (2000) find that large consolidations 
are most effective. While Alesina and Perotti (1997) and subsequent studies by the same 
authors emphasize instead the composition of adjustment, and in particular the gains 
from cutting transfers and other forms of unproductive spending, McDermott and 
Wescott (1996) conclude that both the size and composition of fiscal consolidation are 
important, which is precisely what has been found in this paper too. 
 
Initial fiscal conditions and the other economic policies that accompany fiscal 
consolidation may also play a role. While some studies find no evidence that these 
things are important, OECD (1996), Alesina and Ardagna (1998) and Perotti (1999) 
suggest that the initial level of debt, an exchange rate depreciation preceding 
consolidation, wag restraint, and/or fiscal consolidation in the context of broader 
structural reform influence whether a fiscal consolidation is expansionary or 
contractionary. 
 
Finally, the investment response to fiscal consolidation is important in some 
studies. Although the theoretical literature emphasizes the role of private consumption, 
Alesina and Ardagna (1998) and Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998) find that the 
behavior of investment prior to, during, and after fiscal consolidations is also 
significant, and in some cases more important, determinant of growth. Further evidence 
supporting this thesis has been also provided in this paper. 
                                                 
27 Successful consolidations are larger, of longer duration, or have a significant impact on the 
debt ratio.   35 
Appendix 2. The Lorenz Curve and the Gini Coefficient
28  
 
The following gives a brief graphical explanation of the Gini coefficient and the 
construction of equivalence scales. For further reference on these and other issues 
related to the design and analysis of household surveys, see Deaton (1997). 
 





















A straightforward graphical interpretation of the Gini coefficient is the Lorenz 
curve, which is the thick curve in the figure above. The horizontal axis plots the 
cumulative percentage of the population whose inequality is under consideration, 
starting  from the poorest and ending with the richest. The vertical axis plots the 
cumulative percentage of income associated with the units on the horizontal axis. In the 
case of a completely egalitarian income distribution in which the whole population has 
equal incomes, the Lorenz curve would be the dashed straight 45-degree line. When 
inequality exists, the poor population has a proportionately lower share of income 
compared with the rich population, and the Lorenz curve may look like the above thick 
curve below the 45-degree line. As inequality rises, so the thick curve moves towards 
the bottom right-hand corner. 
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The Gini coefficient is the area A between the 45-degree line and the Lorenz 
curve. The Gini coefficient may be given as a proportion or percentage. From this it is 
clear that the Gini coefficient will be equal to 0 when the distribution is completely 
egalitarian. If the society's total income accrues to only one person/household unit, 
leaving the rest with no income at all, then the Gini coefficient will be equal to 1, or 
100%. 
 
Appendix 3. The Economic Impact of Fiscal Adjustments during the 1990s. 
Complementary Data 
 
Table A.2. Initial Fiscal Conditions, Budget Composition and Strategies of Fiscal 
Adjustments, 1990-2000  
 
 
   Non-Adjust.           Adjustment        
         Revenue Based          Expenditure Based    
         Before  During  After     Before  During  After 
Fiscal Policy                   
                   
Debt Ratio  66.64   75.80  81.80  86.65   68.85  65.68  68.07 
Var. Debt Ratio  0.30   2.09  1.90  -0.49   2.42  0.39  -2.31 
                   
Budget Balance  -2.84   -5.18  -4.72  -3.50   -5.56  -3.40  -1.76 
Var. Budget Balance  0.26   -0.81  1.11  0.75   -0.59  1.41  0.81 
                   
Total Revenues  46.87   45.92  45.76  47.17   46.81  48.30  46.53 
Var. Total Revenues  0.31   0.08  1.26  -0.08   -0.01  0.76  -0.21 
Total Direct Taxes  14.38   14.74  14.51  15.38   15.08  15.87  14.21 
Var. T. Direct Taxes  -0.04   0.04  0.78  -0.03   -0.15  0.37  -0.08 
                   
Total Expenditures  50.31   51.18  50.15  50.53   54.45  52.44  49.35 
Var. Total Expenditures  0.13   0.48  0.03  -0.12   0.74  -0.67  -0.74 
Total Transfers  12.23   11.87  11.06  11.74   13.11  12.30  11.52 
Var. T. Transfers  -0.02   -0.09  -0.05  -0.01   0.03  -0.26  -0.24 
Total Public Wages  18.89   19.18  18.81  17.61   18.91  17.47  11.52 
Var. T. Public Wages  -0.05   -0.09  0.20  -0.01   0.30  -0.80  -0.64 
Total Pub. Investment  2.82   2.51  2.54  2.70   2.78  2.46  2.33 
Var. T. P. Investment  0.01   -0.01  0.01  0.05   -0.03  -0.07  -0.04 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Table A.3. Monetary Policy and Fiscal Adjustments, 1990-2000  
 
   Non-Adjust.           Adjustment        
         Revenue Based          Expenditure Based    
         Before  During  After     Before  During  After 
Monetary Policy                   
                   
Real Interest Rate 
(ShTerm)  4.13   5.71  5.17  4.90   4.71  3.75  3.22 
Var. Real Interest Rate  -0.24   -0.13  -0.23  -0.22   -1.13  -0.36  -0.40 
Real Interest Rate (G4)  0.04   0.86  0.99  1.00   0.47  -0.30  0.31 
                   
Real Exchange Rate  100.46   100.87  101.79  101.69   99.65  106.60  100.63 
Var. Real Exchange Rate  -0.44    0.67  0.28  -0.14    -2.66  0.96  0.40 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Table A.4. Microeconomic Outcomes, Trade Policy Outcomes and Fiscal Adjustments, 1990-2000  
Source: Own elaboration 
 
  Non-Adjust.           Adjustment        
         Revenue Based          Expenditure Based    
         Before  During  After     Before  During  After 
Microeconomic Outcomes                   
                   
Private Consumption  56.59   56.44  57.82  56.77   56.22  57.63  58.71 
Var. Private Consumption  -0.09   -0.07  0.11  0.02   -0.04  0.43  0.69 
                   
Private Investment  17.83   16.82  17.37  16.71   16.74  17.41  18.44 
Var. Private Investment  -0.09   0.11  0.27  -0.21   0.05  0.30  0.62 
                   
Labor Costs Index  100.65   102.20  102.05  100.25   102.41  100.07  99.60 
Var. Labor Costs  -0.63   -0.12  -0.15  -0.29   -1.20  -1.34  -1.63 
                   
Profits Share  31.73   31.67  31.02  31.74   31.20  31.98  32.12 
Var. Profits Share  0.03   0.05  0.02  0.07   0.04  0.46  0.27 
                   
Trade Policy Outcomes                   
Imports  40.81   41.29  39.70  40.35   35.76  36.74  39.63 
Var. Imports  1.33   0.97  0.43  0.97   1.67  1.54  1.76 
                   
Exports  31.19   29.60  27.50  28.37   29.46  30.47  36.14 
Var. Exports  1.17   0.54  0.46  1.02   1.55  1.66  1.43 
                   
Trade Balance  2.04   1.33  0.88  1.72   1.41  2.07  2.86 
Var. Trade Balance  0.27    0.10  0.70  0.11    0.41  0.83  0.33   38 
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